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A

FULL and CANDID

ANSWER

To a Pamphlet, entitled,

CONSIDERATIONS

ON

THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.

——— *Sapientes, pacis cauſa, bellum gerunt, et laborem, ſpe otii, ſuſtinent.*

SALLUST.

DUBLIN:

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A FULL and CANDID

ANSWER, &c.

IT is not to be expected that an Anſwer to a profeſſed invective againſt the king of Pruſſia, will ſet out with any ſevere reflections againſt that monarch. The author of the Conſiderations has introduced his pamphlet with a quotation from a reſcript, ſaid to be delivered and printed at the ſame time by the Pruſſian miniſter at London; the ſum of which is, "that his Pruſſian majeſty hopes the Engliſh nation will not meddle with the domeſtic affairs of the empire;" and the author archly applies this to the preſent conduct of the court of London. I ſhall not take advantage of an obſervation which every man, who knows the turns of ſtates, may make upon the inconſiſtencies which the moſt ſteady governments, ſometimes, run into, when their intereſts vary: I ſhall only ſay, that the quotation of the reſcript is by no manner of means applicable to the purpoſe of the conſiderer. The empire of Germany is, properly ſpeaking, a republic of ſovereigns, and each ſovereign that forms it, has a right, independent of the emperor, to make what alliances he pleaſes with other ſovereigns; nor can ſuch alliances be conſidered as domeſtic affairs of the empire. At the time his Pruſſian majeſty publiſhed the reſcript in queſtion, the affair he hints at, might in ſome meaſure be looked upon as domeſtic to the empire, becauſe a diſpute lay between the princes of the empire and the electors. Great-Britain had no right to interfere in ſuch a diſpute; Great-Britain did not interfere in it; at the ſame time, if his Pruſſian majeſty was author of that reſcript, he might perhaps, with

greater propriety, have made uſe of the word œconomical, than domeſtic.

The author of the Conſiderations ſpends the firſt ſix firſt pages of his pamphlet in proving what no body will diſpute, that France is ſuperior to Great-Britain in extent of territory, and number of inhabitants; and he brings Voltaire, a good writer, but a moſt miſerable author, to vouch for the vaſt armies that Lewis XIV. kept on foot. But the author of the Conſiderations is miſtaken in his firſt principles. The battles of Creſſy, Poictiers, and Agincourt, were gained by Engliſhmen, and Engliſhmen alone: the battle of Minden, which, every thing conſidered, was more glorious than all the three, was gained by Britons, with a more confeſſed ſuperiority againſt them, than there was againſt the ſon of Edward the Third, or the father of Henry the Sixth.

There is undoubtedly a principle of political, as well as of commercial, arithmetic; but the data of the former are extremely hard to be ſettled. The conſiderer goes to work in the Cheapſide way; he poſts his books, he ſtrikes his balance, but he does not give weight for inches, though he brings forth a moſt plauſible account. I will venture to ſay that hiſtory cannot produce a period of glory that is not liable to exception, if thoſe mechanical calculations are to take place. "From the time, ſays the conſiderer, when the whole of France was united to the crown, and the liberties of the ſtates and nobility abſolutely ſubjected to its power, the kingdom of France has been, in the extent of its country, the number of its inhabitants, and the greatneſs of its revenue, ſuperior to Britain." I admit that France, in the extent of its country, and the number of its inhabitants, is ſuperior to Great-Britain; but that its revenue is equal, I totally deny. Great-Britain, properly ſpeaking, has no revenue that is fixed or ſettled. And let the conſiderer authenticate the revenues of France for theſe two years paſt, and reduce the re-

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venue, or rather the expences of our government, during that time, to French money: let the meaneſt and moſt ignorant reader he has, pronounce which is the richeſt people.

I am aware of a prodigious and popular advantage the conſiderer has taken in point of calculation; and, at the ſame time, I will be candid enough to ſay, that if his data are to be admitted, he might have carried his argument much farther than he has done. He ſerves his purpoſe perhaps better in not doing it. But I totally deny and diſclaim his data, or firſt principles. "I never, ſays he, read the hiſtory of the two grand alliances, which were formed by king William againſt the growing power of France, without feeling the warmeſt ſentiments of gratitude to the great deliverer of Europe. Never did king of England appear with greater dignity, than he did in that great congreſs held at the Hague in the year 1691, when the emperor and empire, the kings of Spain, Sweden, and Denmark, by their ſeveral ambaſſadors, the electors of Germany by their particular miniſters, and ſeveral of them in their own perſons, with at leaſt fifty of the greateſt princes of Germany, all attended to hear him plead the cauſe of Europe; and all joined in one common league and declaration againſt France."

It is undoubtedly a taſk equally bold as it is diſagreeable, to combat rooted prejudices; but now that the ridiculous diſtinctions of Whig and Tory are ſo juſtly exploded, a public writer may have ſome chance for a fair hearing. I do not pretend to deny that king William was at the head of the glorious confederacy; but I will, with both my hands, deny, that that confederacy fulfilled its engagements: they brought troops upon paper; they produced them not in the field; they hired armies, but England paid them. Unwilling as I am to revive party diſtinctions, I am ſorry to ſay, I never yet ſaw, though I have taken a great deal of pains in the inquiry, a full and a fair anſwer

ſwer to the charge brought by the Tory miniſtry againſt the Whigs, at the time of the peace of Utrecht, that the whole ſtreſs of the war lay on the ſhoulders of Great-Britain, and that her allies had failed in, almoſt, every point of their engagements, as to men, money, and operations of every kind: this, I ſay, is a charge that the boldeſt Whig writer never attempted to anſwer. It is a charge which the German and Dutch miniſters, and they had at that time the ableſt in Europe, in all their warm memorials and repreſentations, never offered to refute. It is a charge which brought the great prince Eugene over to England; but far from anſwering, he endeavoured to palliate, it. The rival minſters, in thoſe times, were compoſed of, perhaps, the greateſt men that England ever ſaw under any government; but the Whigs indiſputably had reſolution, talents, and penetration ſuperior to their antagoniſts. They never pretended to diſpute the fact, that Great-Britain was left in the lurch for the blood and treaſure that was expended in the war.

Let not therefore declamation or bold aſſertions drive us out of the fort of common ſenſe. Let us not imagine, becauſe we are now in a war with France, carried on in Germany, we fight in the ſmalleſt degree on greater diſadvantage than we did in the times of king William and queen Anne. I ſhall, in the courſe of this paper, prove, that the terms on which we now carry on the war, are, nationally ſpeaking, infinitely preferable to thoſe on which we fought before; I will not except even the laſt war againſt France.

Had the conſiderer been a candid oppoſer of the preſent meaſures of our government, he would not have gone ſo far back as the reign of king William for an alliance of ſtrength and dignity againſt France. The late king George was united with the houſe of Auſtria, and at laſt brought the Dutch to take part with him, when the empreſs-queen might have been ſaid to fight *pro aris & focis*. In what a dreadful ſitu-

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ation is an Engliſh miniſter! There was not, when we entered into that war with France, ſo popular a topic in the world, as the expediency of maintaining the pragmatic ſanction. Its popularity, both within and without doors, aroſe next to madneſs; and had not the miniſtry given way to the torrent, it would have borne down the barriers of civil government. But, in the event, were we, as a people, bettered by that illuſtrious alliance? Did the Dutch and Auſtrians fight for us in the field? Did they negociate with us in the cabinet? Were not our ſoldiers butchered by their cowardice? Were not our councils betrayed by their perfidy?

" Every meaſure, ſays the conſiderer, which tends to ſet the ſtates of Germany, Holland, and England, either at war with each other, or amongſt themſelves, muſt be a meaſure calculated for the good of France, and the prejudice of other powers of Europe. For the ſame reaſon, every meaſure tending to the continuance or increaſe of ſuch a war, muſt be for the benefit of France, and the prejudice of Europe: becauſe it is a weakening of the rivals of France, and keeping thoſe powers at variance, from whom France can have nothing to fear but in the union."

I have given this paſſage at large, becauſe I apprehend that it is the corner-ſtone of the conſiderer's reaſoning; but a very ſmall diſcuſſion of facts will diſcover its futility. Will the conſiderer ſay, that Great-Britain is never to make war with France, till ſuch time as all the powers in Europe are united againſt her? That time, it is believed, never will come, and that time never was. The confederacy of which king William was the head, was the ſtrongeſt union ever formed againſt France: but what did it avail England? ſhe was left to bear the brunt of the day; ſhe was obliged to pay the troops, and fight the battles of her nominal allies.

After all, the confederacy formed by king William proved, as all confederacies muſt be againſt one capital

capital power, to be a mere rope of ſand. Its continuity was preſerved until a certain twiſt came, which diſſolved it. Holland and Germany would undoubtedly have been pleaſed, had we continued to this day to pay the troops, and fight their battles; they would in a very cheap manner have muſtered their armies, and regulated their contingencies upon paper: but the moment that Great-Britain came to talk of her own intereſt, then came in the democratic nonſenſe of public faith, the liberties of Europe, prior engagements, national honour, and a thouſand ſuch terms, which meant nothing but money; nothing but Britiſh blood, or Britiſh money. It may to ſome, perhaps, ſeem too bold an aſſertion, (but nothing can be too bold that is founded on truth and experience) that had Great-Britain, in all the wars ſhe ever had with France, been ſingle and alone, her expence would have been leſs, her ſucceſs would have been greater.

The ſum of the conſiderer's reaſoning is, that France is more populous, and therefore more powerful, than Great-Britain. This puts me in mind of the reaſoning of the honourable admiral who was ſo deſervedly ſhot for his cowardice, and who, after weighing a French cannon-ball, hung it up in a cabbage-net at the ſhrouds of his ſhip, and demonſtrated, as clearly as that three and two make five, that had he come within reach of that cannon-ball, he and his ſhip muſt have been torn to pieces. I will defy the conſiderer, from all the experience of reading, he, or any man, ever had, to produce a ſingle inſtance of two nations going to war with one another upon ſuch principles: and this brings me to come to cloſer quarters with the conſiderer.

In private life it is but too common, when two parties go to Weſtminſter-hall, for a by-ſtander, from the weight of their purſes, to form a ſhrewd gueſs which will have the better in the end. The conſiderer looks upon the extent of territory, and numbers

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of men, when two nations go to war, the ſame as a long purſe is when two parties go to law. I can by no means be of that opinion ; and I can ſcarcely dip into a page of hiſtory, which does not convince me that it is ill founded. Parties who go to law are ſubjected to its forms, which drain their purſes. Nations who go to war, have no directory but the ſword. But allowing Great-Britain to be as mean and contemptible a power as Corſica itſelf; (ſuppoſing Corſica to be a ſovereign ſtate) is ſhe to bear an inſult from a neighbouring power, becauſe that neighbour is a garagantua? Sovereign ſtates have no appeal that they can make to their ſuperiors ; but a wiſe ſtate, ever ſo feeble, will make a ſtruggle in defence of its independency, be its enemy ever ſo powerful. The conſideration, therefore, of inequality of power between Great-Britain and France muſt drop to the ground, unleſs it can be proved that the cauſe in which we fight is unjuſt : a taſk which I apprehend the conſiderer himſelf will be far from attempting.

The conſider, as if conſcious that his general reaſoning upon the inequality of force between the two ſtates cannot bear the teſt of reaſon, proceeds to ſhew that Great-Britain is in the wrong to carry on a war in Germany againſt France. In order to introduce this reaſoning, he lays down certain maxims, every one of which in fact, as well as in ſpeculation, are falſe and trite. Every ſchool-boy knows that France, formerly, again and again defended the liberties of Germany. The conſiderer has flouriſhed upon that, but has he informed the publick againſt whom ſhe defended thoſe liberties? Has he told his countrymen, that it was againſt the encroachments and uſurpations of the houſe of Auſtria; that tyrannical power, which the government of Great-Britain and her allies are endeavouring, at this very time, to withſtand? Had the conſiderer been candid enough to explain this matter, it might have ſaved himſelf

and me, and perhaps the public, no little labour He has taken all advantages of reaſoning from the former ſyſtems that prevailed in Europe, but he has not told us that thoſe ſyſtems exiſt no more. He has not been ingenuous enough to ſay, that there is no period in hiſtory, before the preſent, in which the houſes of Bourbon and Auſtria, like Herod and Pontius Pilate, agreed in the crucifixion of public liberty: nor is there in all his pamphlet, a ſingle paragraph upon that ſubject, though it is the only fair, the only candid, the only conſtitutional, topic, upon which a conſiderer on the preſent German war ought to proceed. If he proceeds not upon that, he ſays leſs than nothing. If he proceeds upon that, the conduct of Great-Britain, and her government, muſt at preſent appear irreproachable and unblamable.

The conſiderer, therefore, may figure away to eternity upon his comparative and political arithmetic; but if the facts upon which his data are founded have no longer exiſtence, which is the caſe, to what does his reaſoning tend, but to ſeduce weak minds, and to break that unanimity, which at preſent forms the pride, the glory, and ſtrength of the Britiſh empire? Were the conſiderer to bring a million of inſtances of what France has done, or what Britain has ſuffered in former times, *cui bono?* What can it avail him, if thoſe inſtances are not applicable to the preſent juncture? and applicable they cannot be, unleſs he can, from hiſtory, produce a ſimilarity of circumſtances. The conſiderer, with a true polemic ſpirit, ſuppoſes two powers of Germany at war; "if France, ſays he, to keep up the conteſt, ſhould take the weaker ſide, and add to the power whoſe force is eight, ſo as to be ſuperior to ten, the evil is not leſſened, but made greater. Should England be ſo unfortunate as to join in the conteſt, and ſend its land forces of fifty into the war, and France thereupon ſend a force of eighty, the party aſſiſted by England would be but little benefited by the alliance; the

Engliſh

Engliſh would ſtill be the weaker ſide, the force of Europe be diminiſhed ſo much the more, and France only be advantaged. This is a kind of reaſoning which muſt hold invariably juſt in all ages." I ſay, that not a ſingle particle of ſuch reaſoning ever held good in any age, and there never was a more bare-faced inſult, than ſuch reaſoning is, upon the public underſtanding.

According to the conſiderer's apprehenſion, France, by the diſpoſitions of the powers and differences in Europe, has every thing ſhe can wiſh or deſire. She has had it for theſe four or five years, at leaſt, ever ſince we carried our troops into Germany. What has been the conſequence? Is France a greater, a richer, or more ſucceſsful power, through the blunders of Britain? Has ſhe enlarged her territory? Has ſhe increaſed her revenue? Has ſhe repaired her marine? Has ſhe dictated, as formerly, to the Britiſh coun-cils? No. I will give the conſiderer an anſwer, that, in one ſingle word, comprehends folios of logic, and reams of reaſoning. France, with all the advantages which the miſtaken policy of Great-Britain has given her, is now a declared bankrupt to all Europe, and ſhe has declared herſelf ſuch. Let the conſiderer get over the fact, and then

'To dinner with what appetite he may.'

"I don't determine, ſays the conſiderer, whether the Germans are likely ſoon to agree together in any one point; and much in uniting with England and the States-General in a war with France: but till they do thus agree, England has nothing to do with their little internal quarrels." You don't determine, Mr. or my Lord, conſiderer; but I do: and I ſay and affirm from paſt experience, (I care not what prepoſſeſſions may lie againſt the doctrine) that the fewer allies England has againſt France, provided thoſe allies, as his Pruſſian majeſty certainly is, are hearty in the cauſe, Great-Britain is a gainer; ſhe ſees the end of her expence, ſhe knows the extent of her operations;

which is more than ſhe did in any continental war ſhe ever embraced.

The conſiderer affects to call the preſent war a German civil war, and the whole of his pamphlet is levelled againſt Great-Britain taking part in it. I deny, in the moſt direct terms, that the war between the king of Pruſſia and the houſe of Auſtria, or rather Lorrain, can with the leaſt propriety, either of ſpeech or reaſoning, be termed a civil war. The quarrel between the king of Pruſſia and the queen of Hungary has not in the ſmalleſt or moſt remote degree, a relation to that ſyſtem of political confederacy which conſtitutes the kings of Great-Britain or Pruſſia members, or, if the ſanguine conſiderer will have it, ſubjects of the Germanic body. It is, in ſhort, either the good or bad fortune of the conſiderer, that the poſition he lays down, if admitted, muſt eſtabliſh his doctrines, if diſputed, the whole appears futile and fallacious. The king of Pruſſia as a ſovereign prince, is as independent, perhaps more ſo, than the empreſs-queen is. Were the conſiderer to be allowed his own ſway, he undoubtedly would carry every thing before him, by the plain ſelf-evident maxim, that Great-Britain is worſe than mad to pretend to ſupport one little German prince, againſt the Germanic body.

But here I muſt again have recourſe to principles, and again obſerve that our conſiderer's principles are fundamentally wrong. The king of Pruſſia's dominions undoubtedly are in Germany, and our conſiderer takes advantage of that to treat him, through the whole of his pamphlet, as a German prince, ſubject rather to the dictates of the emperor, than the laws of the empire. How different muſt the reaſoning reſulting from ſuch poſitions appear, when we conſider his Pruſſian majeſty equal, at leaſt in dignity, to the Vandemont family, and in himſelf an independent ſovereign, at the head of the proteſtant in-

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tereſt upon the continent, and the only natural ally left there for Great-Britain? Were the conſtitutions of Germany to be examined, it would be found that both the elector of Hanover and the elector of Brandenbourg, without changing their religion, have as good a title to be choſen emperor, as the huſband of the queen of Hungary, who *corregentiae jure*, has.

Will the conſiderer be mean or wicked enough to ſay, that Great-Britain at this juncture, ought to abandon all the ſyſtem and principles of policy upon which her power and independency is formed? If ſhe does not, let the boldeſt advocate for anti-continental meaſures ſtep forth, and point out what courſe ſhe could have ſteered different from what ſhe has done? Let the *laudatores temporis acti* declaim as they pleaſe; let the conſiderer ring his changes upon former meaſures; but whilſt the power of France exiſts, is not Great-Britain to guard againſt her ambition? That the power of France exiſts, is the baſis of our conſiderer's doctrine. That we have not purſued the war upon the principles and meaſures that directed us in former times, muſt equally be admitted. But for that reaſon objects are changed; the ſame ſyſtem no longer exiſts; and the ballance of power in the point where it formerly vibrated, is now a non-entity. Upon the ſuppoſition of this ballance being an entity, the conſiderer has raiſed his whole fabrick. The ſmalleſt ſpark of candour would have taught him, that when king William formed the grand confederacy, the ſupport of the houſe of Auſtria, upon the continent, was his great object. Why was that his object? Becauſe he reaſonably thought that the houſe of Auſtria, was the grand counterpoiſe upon the continent, to the ambition of the houſe of Bourbon, and the houſe of Bourbon was the power which England and Holland had then the greateſt reaſon to dread. Had they dreaded the houſe of Auſtria, king William, like queen Elizabeth, would have directed his attention, and formed his alliance accordingly. Auſtria and

Bourbon

Bourbon are only ſounds, the danger reſulting from either is the matter.

If the danger reſulting from the houſe of Auſtria to the liberties of Europe, was an object of attention in queen Elizabeth, that has done immortal honour to her memory; if the forming an alliance againſt the houſe of Bourbon, has done the ſame to the memory of king William, and to the Whig adminiſtration under queen Anne; if the boldeſt advocates for anti-continental meaſures, never yet pretended that the ballance of power in Europe was a chimæra; how is Great-Britain, in the preſent juncture, to behave, when the houſes of Auſtria and Bourbon are embarked in one common cauſe, the ruin of the proteſtant intereſt?

" But, ſays the conſiderer, we happen to have one nominal proteſtant prince on our ſide; and therefore the proteſtant intereſt has been ſpecioufly held out to our view. But in the laſt war we were fighting for the queen of Hungary, and the proteſtant prince had only a popiſh king of France for his defender. Did we think then the proteſtant intereſt at all concerned in that war? And why ſhould we in this? This great champion of proteſtantiſm was then univerſally decried by us, as a man void of faith, religion, and every good principle."

Drained as the nation has been of late to the very dregs of political writing, I know no man ſo great a dunce, or Quixote, as to imagine that every prince, and every potentate, does not purſue his own intereſt, if he can ſee it, or if he thinks he ſees it. A great and a ſenſible prince can have no principle but intereſt, becauſe it never can be his true intereſt to adopt a ſyſtem of fraud, perfidy, and injuſtice. If, with Lewis the XIVth of France, he ſhall adopt ſuch a ſyſtem, he is no great prince. His greatneſs is temporary, and, like that of Lewis, it muſt have an end in his own life-time.

But let us not be deceived by bold ſounds and aſ-

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ſertions. I deny that our illuſtrious ally is more a nominal proteſtant, than the heads of the houſes of Auſtria and Bourbon are nominal papiſts. The king of Pruſſia cannot be more properly ſtiled a nominal proteſtant, than king George the Iſt, IId, or IIId, can be. If the conſiderer can prove, what I think has been never yet attempted to be proved, that the intereſts he had in view were fundamentally falſe, unjuſt, and injurious to any other power, he would then ſay ſomewhat to the purpoſe. But if both his connexions, and thoſe of Great-Britain, were only, as they certainly were, accidental, and not ſyſtematical, the conſiderer is as much wrong in his reaſoning, as he is in his facts. The connexions of Great-Britain with the houſe of Auſtria, in the times which he hints at, were occaſioned by accidents, viz. the death of Charles the VIth of Germany, and the violence which France offered to her own guaranty of the pragmatic ſanction. Independent of thoſe conſiderations, his Pruſſian majeſty had, as we muſt ſuppoſe he thought, a claim of right upon certain dominions, which lie not, as the conſiderer ſays, in an obſcure corner of Germany, but are well known to every one who knows the ſmalleſt tittle of geography or hiſtory. I am old enough to remember when this claim was ſtarted, and when it was made good. His Pruſſian majeſty ſupported it by what I muſt call uncontroverted, and therefore I muſt ſuppoſe uncontrovertible, reaſons; for I never ſaw a ſcrap from the houſe of Auſtria that diſputed the facts of the family compacts, upon which the claim was founded. It is, therefore, infamous to inſinuate, that becauſe the intereſt of Pruſſia happened at that time to lead her to ſide with France, that therefore this proteſtant prince had only a popiſh king of France for his defender: the fact is falſe and unſupported; and all the conſiderer poſſibly can gain by his inſinuations and aſſertions, is what I believe no mortal is weak enough to diſpute, that, amongſt princes, proteſtantiſm and popery,

popery, and in fact, religion, are words that ſometimes ſignify nothing.

But though I ſincerely think, that in the cabinets of ſovereigns the popiſh or proteſtant religion are words that neither have nor ought to have, any meaning, yet I think the popiſh or proteſtant intereſts are terms that not only have meaning, but are of the moſt deciſive importance to us, as men and Engliſhmen. Accidents, as I have already hinted, may ſometimes interfere, and give a ſhock to the vehicle, but it muſt ſtill in time return to its true and its natural poſition. Is there a man in England weak enough to doubt, that while Great-Britain was fighting in conjunction with the houſe of Auſtria, the heads of that houſe were not the moſt miſerable bigots that ever polluted an altar by ſuperſtition? And yet thoſe bigots, though not of the proteſtant religion, fought for the proteſtant intereſt, that is, for the independency of Germany and Britain.

That the king of Pruſſia was ever decry'd by this nation, as a man void of faith, religion, and every good principle, is a moſt execrable falſhood. It is equally ſo, that we, as the conſiderer affirms, ſet out in this war with conſidering him as an enemy to our proteſtant electorate. It is equally falſe, that we hired an army of Ruſſians to invade him.

——————————— *Quis tam*
Ferreus ut teneat ſe?

" What is it, ſays the conſiderer, then, that has at once changed him in our opinion, from a deſpiſer of all religion to the defender of the proteſtant? But not to inſiſt on this." Can a man of common ſenſe and honeſty ſit, with any degree of patience, and hear ſuch infamous invectives ſpewed forth, was his Pruſſian majeſty no more than a private gentleman? The conſiderer pretends that at the time of the breaking out of the preſent war, the proteſtant religion in Germany (for I will contract his argument as much as poſſible without weakening it) was in no danger. The conſider-

er amuſes us with ſounds. Can he produce a reſcript, can he produce a ſcrap of writing from his Pruſſian majeſty, or any proteſtant power in the world, that ever pretended it was in danger? But I will venture to ſay, and will defy all mankind to prove the contrary, that the proteſtant intereſt was in danger. It may, however, be neceſſary to clear up the diſtinction I make between the proteſtant religion, and the proteſtant intereſt. This I cannot do better than by ſuppoſing that a power now exiſts in Europe that profeſſes proteſtantiſm, and yet ſides with France and Auſtria in this preſent war. Such powers, tho' they may pray with proteſtants, undoubtedly act for papiſts; though they are of the proteſtant religion, they are not in the proteſtant intereſt. In ſhort, popery and proteſtantiſm, unleſs applied to the great concerns of civil as well as religious liberty, are mere words to gull the populace, and our conſiderer has applied them accordingly.

I ſhall not impoſe ſo far upon the reader as to quote the identical words of the conſiderer, when he endeavours to prove (as he does in many laboured pages) that, in the preſent war, religion is out of the queſtion. There is not, I believe, in England, a man ſo weak to believe it is; but how does the conſiderer endeavour to impoſe upon weak minds, as if the experience of our hiſtory did not tell us, that proteſtants may fight for a popiſh intereſt, and that papiſts may fight for a proteſtant one? A king in his cloſet, or his chapel, may make no difference between one religion and another; and he may even deſpiſe all religions, and yet true policy, without one grain of religion interfering, may oblige him to adopt religion as the cauſe of fighting.

In the preſent caſe, this conſideration turns, perhaps, deciſively againſt our author, and he himſelf has given riſe to the obſervation. I ſhall ſuppoſe the king of Pruſſia to be void of religion, but if the king of Pruſſia has enemies who are wrong-headed enough

to carry religious wind-mills in their brain, he and his allies has a right to repel all ſuch enthuſiaſtick attacks, in the moſt effectual manner. In ſhort, the whole of our conſiderer's argument upon this head is calculated only for the weakeſt of minds: he knows there neither is, nor can be, the ſmalleſt foundation for ſuch inſinuations, though he has endeavoured to avail himſelf of them.

The conſiderer proceeds, as he does from the beginning to the end of the pamphlet, to take for granted, matters that are no other than unſupported allegations. "An electorate, ſays he, of the empire, is not to be annihilated but by the deſtruction of the whole Germanic conſtitution. For a king of France to make himſelf e——r of H——r, and eject a whole family out of its rights, would be ſo great an act of violence, that every member in the empire would riſe againſt it. Sweden and Denmark could not but take the alarm at it."

A writer who grounds his reaſoning on ſuch infamous falſhoods, which he endeavours to palm upon his readers as uncontrovertible and indiſputable truths, puts me in mind of a malefactor at the gallows. Draw the cart, or kick the ſtool, from under him, and he remains ſuſpended. Is there the lighteſt ſmatterer in hiſtory, who is ignorant that electorates, politically ſpeaking, have been annihilated? witneſs the Palatine, the Saxon, and the Bavarian electorates; ſome of them, I was going to ſay, within our own memory, or that of our fathers, without Sweden or Denmark, or any other power in Europe, making the ſmalleſt effort in their favour. The conſiderer, I am afraid, will never be able to perſwade any man, who has the leaſt experience in life, to believe that every ſubject, or, indeed every prince, in Germany, has adequate ideas of his own intereſts. The ſtates of Greece, a much leſs complicated confederacy than tha t of Germany, had not.

"England

" England, ſays the conſiderer, would not have any reaſon to envy France the impracticable taſk of defending a country, ſurrounded with enemies, and ſeparated from all its other dominions. But in reality, the conſtitution of Europe makes every thing of this kind abſolutely impoſſible. All that France can propoſe, after the greateſt ſucceſs there, can be only to take a temporary poſſeſſion of the country during the war, to hold it in depoſit, as the king of Pruſſia did the electorate of Saxony." Here again happens to be a ſmall miſtake in point of fact, which overthrows the whole of the conſiderer's reaſoning. I affirm it, and will appeal to every man of reaſon and candour, that in the preſent, unprecedented conjuncture, when the head of the empire and the French king, are rivetted in a confederacy againſt the proteſtant intereſt, the electorate of Hanover, if wreſted from the houſe of Brunſwick, may be beſtowed on whom they pleaſe; and perhaps it would not be going too far, ſhould we ſuppoſe, that, even at this time, ſome proteſtant princes of the empire are caſting a wiſhful eye to fill the ſeat of an electorate. Should this ſucceed, it is no more than has already happened.

Page 25. the conſiderer is at infinite pains, (and, indeed, he ſeems to pique himſelf upon it, as his ſort) to prove that we hurt Hanover, and actually the whole proteſtant intereſt in Germany, by making that electorate the ſeat of war. Here, again, I muſt affirm, that the fact is falſe; and I abſolutely deny and defy any man to prove, that Great-Britain has, in the leaſt, contributed to make that electorate the ſeat of war. It was unjuſtly attacked by France, and all the ſophiſtry of mankind cannot pretend, that Great-Britain has not acted a juſt, and, therefore, a wiſe part, in endeavouring to protect that electorate. Let the conſiderer and his friend, if they pleaſe, recur to prudential, but pitiful, principles; let them ſay, that a weaker ſtate is to be oppreſſed by a ſtronger,

and that no intermediate power ought to ſay to the latter, What doeſt thou?

This obſervation brings me to the main beam of our obſerver's reaſoning. He has not endeavoured to prove, that his Pruſſian majeſty was originally wrong in the cauſes for which he went to war; he has not preſumed to ſay, that Great-Britain had not juſt provocations to make war upon France. The conſiderer has not thrown out a ſingle ſyllable to inſinuate, that Hanover was not attacked entirely on account of the French quarrel with Great-Britain in America. This being the caſe, to what abſurdities muſt our conſiderer be reduced? even to that, not only of condemning the practice of the greateſt and wiſeſt princes in former ages, but of aboliſhing out of the ſyſtem of the world, all diſtinctions between right and wrong, and all reſiſtance, where injuſtice and injury are offered. Will the conſiderer avow that doctrine? I hope he will not; I may almoſt venture to ſay, that he dares not; and yet, that doctrine muſt be avowed, before any one of his poſitions can be concluſive. Though romance and realities differ, yet, could the moſt inventive head have deviſed a tract, which Great-Britain, keeping ſight of common ſenſe and common honour, could have followed, but what ſhe has done? The conſiderer is a profeſſed advocate for ſubmiſſion. Submiſſion to what? to violence, fraud and injuſtice? Should that doctrine take place, the light of the ſun may be ſaid to be extinguiſhed. In this men and communities do not differ in their relations. The law of nature, as Cicero has ſenſibly explained it, dictates the principles of ſelf-preſervation. And every individual, if he conſults his own ſafety, will conſult the ſafety of the whole. Are ſtates to be oppreſſed more than private men are, meerly becauſe they are weak? Does not common intereſt, as well as common honeſty, call upon one ſtate to aſſiſt another when oppreſſed? For what are ſocieties formed, and alliances made, but to defend the weaker againſt the ſtronger? How in-

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famous would it be, was Great-Britain allied with a power far more conſiderable than herſelf, and bound by every tye of gratitude and faith to ſupport her, ſhould that power tell her, that it is her beſt courſe, to give way to ſuperior force, and that a little dragooning will do her no diſſervice, becauſe the ſmart will ſoon be over, and that, was ſhe to receive any aſſiſtance, her caſe would be worſe.

But in fact, the public of Great-Britain is abuſed in nothing more, than in that way of reaſoning, which is adopted by the conſiderer. Where is the nation in the world that ever would have done any thing great, any thing glorious, or indeed wiſe, had her government made her intereſt the *only* ſtandard of her honour? A great people know, that honour, reputation, and dignity, *form* their intereſt; nor could Great-Britain at this time have arrived to the pitch of power and riches, ſhe now poſſeſſes, had ſhe been always mercenary enough, to have made her dignity ſubſervient to any conſideration whatſoever. "A ſmall ſtate, ſays the conſiderer, (p. 25.) which is invaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than itſelf, is doubtleſs under a great misfortune; all reſiſtance is uſeleſs, and it has nothing to do but ſubmit. But there is a way of doubling this misfortune; and that is by having another great ſtate, almoſt equal to the invader, undertake the defence of it. If the country ſubmit, it has but one army to maintain, and may in the beginning yield upon terms, which are tolerable; but if it be defended, it has then two armies in it, and is ſure to be oppreſſed by them both." Had I not given the quotation fairly in the conſiderer's words, a reader who has the ſmalleſt ſentiment of virtue and humanity, might have doubted, whether ſuch ſtuff could have fallen from the pen of any writer who wears the ſtamp of manhood; in reality, the whole of the performance I am now anſwering, ought to have been entitled, *An Apology for France*; nor is there from the beginning to the end of it, a ſingle

principle,

principle, but that Great-Britain ought to diſſolve every tye of humanity and juſtice, and leave France and Auſtria the unmoleſted liberty of deſolating Europe, and at laſt of enſlaving Britain; for there is not an argument for Hanover's ſubmitting to France, brought by the conſiderer, that is not with equal, nay, greater reaſon, applicable to Great-Britain. If ſhe has an army in her bowels, ſhe ought to ſubmit; ſhe ought not to double her own miſery by increaſing the number of mouths ſhe has to maintain, or by adding hands to war, that many headed monſter, too apt of itſelf to devour the moſt innocent and the moſt unoffending.

But it unfortunately happens, that the conſiderer's facts are as falſe as his reaſoning. I cannot, by any manner of means, ſee that Hanover is, at preſent, oppreſſed by prince Ferdinand's army; I can ſee the Britiſh nation making glorious, and not unſucceſsful, efforts, for ſaving an electorate, that has been almoſt ruined, for the ſake of Great-Britain. "Did the ſun, ſays the conſiderer inſultingly, refuſe to ſhine, or the river ceaſe to flow, when France was in poſſeſſion of Hanover?" Philoſophers will tell him, they did not; becauſe injuſtice is the worſt inverſion of nature's courſe. As a Politician I anſwer, that neither of thoſe Phenomenas would have happened, had the French been in poſſeſſion of London, as well as of Hanover.

The conſiderer proceeds, in the ſame inſulting ſtrain, to upbraid the Hanoverians for breaking the convention of Cloſter-Seven. Here again is a material miſtake in point of fact, for it is a moſt infamous falſhood to ſay, that the Hanoverians did break that convention. His late majeſty's reſcripts and manifeſtos made it plain, without the poſſibility of contradiction, that the French broke it themſelves, by inſiſting upon terms of oppreſſion and injuſtice, which were not ſtipulated in the convention. This is a truth, that the French miniſtry themſelves, keen and eager, as they were, at that time, did not pre-

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tend to contradict; and his late majesty, whose veracity was perhaps as irreproachable and unimpeached as that of any prince who ever breathed, had the glory and satisfaction to see his conduct, in resuming his arms, approved of by all Europe. I can scarcely except the court of France itself. Before the considerer had thrown out against his late majesty a charge of breaking a convention, made under such tender circumstances as that of Closter-Seven was, he ought to have descended to particulars, and to have refuted the allegations in his late majesty's memorials and manifestos, published on that occasion. Let the public, therefore, upon the whole, judge of an author who offers such an insult to the memory of that venerable head that is now laid in the dust. In my own life-time I have known judicial sentences past against the revilers of the memory of king William, 40 years after his death; but here is the memory of the greatest and the best monarch that ever Britain had, insulted before his ashes are cold in the grave that receives them. The subject dispenses with ceremony, and even with forms of writing; the fact is false; his late majesty did not break the convention of Closter-Seven. His late majesty avowed his resuming arms; he justified that resumption, and the considerer cannot, without incurring the censure of the blackest calumny, maintain his assertion, that his late majesty was guilty of a most scandalous breach of faith.

The considerer thinks himself excessively strong in his impeachment of the king of Prussia's conduct, when he mentions the great hardships which the electorate of Saxony underwent, when it was in possession of the Prussians. Who doubts it? but who was to blame? Has the considerer offered a single argument, to prove, that the king of Prussia was not well founded, in justice as well as prudence, in his proceedings against that electorate? Has he offered a colour of reason to prove, that, had not the king

of

of Pruſſia acted as he did, he and the proteſtant intereſt in Germany, muſt have been totally ruined? Is any power, eſpecially an independent power, to anſwer for the conſequences of another's injuſtice? If the elector of Saxony, by his iniquitous combination againſt the elector of Brandenbourg, obliged the latter to put the citizens of Leipſic under a ſevere contribution, the elector of Saxony, and not the elector of Brandenbourg, was to blame.

Delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.

Talking as men, what heart does not feel for the miſeries, loſſes, and misfortunes of ſubjects, through the injuſtice of the princes. I never ſee a French priſoner, without conſidering him as the innocent victim of his ſovereign's perfidy. All arguments therefore, drawn from conſiderations of humanity, when inhumanity is practiſed, are unneceſſary, idle, or futile. If the injuſtice of one prince, makes it neceſſary for another to proceed with ſeverity againſt the innocent ſubjects of another power; he who gives the provocation alone is to blame, and alone is anſwerable for all conſequences. Princes do not make war upon one another's perſons or palaces. The moſt generous and humane, and moſt virtuous princes that ever lived, have been obliged, in juſtice to their own ſubjects, to proceed againſt thoſe of another, in a manner againſt which their nature has revolted. The moſt underſtanding reader in Europe, perhaps, therefore, will be puzzled to find out the meaning of the conſiderer's reaſoning, between the 31ſt and 38th pages of his conſiderations; if he has any meaning, it is, that Great-Britain, did not Hanover lie in Germany, would have no army in Germany.

Again, the fact is falſe; for before the electors of Hanover were kings of Great-Britain, Great-Britain had armies in Germany; nay what was ſtill more expenſive, they had armies in Spain and in Portugal; for what reaſon? undoubtedly to maintain the balance of the power in Europe, and, in whatever quarter

that

that balance is endangered, the Britiſh arms ought to find buſineſs. This is reaſoning that never yet has been diſputed, it is what has been adopted by every wiſe miniſter, and by every patriot that ever England had; nor do I remember a proſtitute of the pen ſo abandoned, as to contradict it.

The conſiderer enjoys an imaginary triumph, when he pretends to ſhow that Great-Britain fights at a vaſt diſadvantage with France in Germany, and that the preſervation of Hanover ought not to be an object of our concern, nor would the French attack it, did we not defend it. He ſeems to have laid the fort of his reaſoning upon thoſe principles, and he has laid them down in a multiplicity of words; but as uſual, every fact is falſe The French, before the preſent war, have again and again, through the mere luſt of power, and wantonneſs of ambition, laid waſte German electorates. The liberties of Europe were then endangered, but leſs than they are now, and Great-Britain interpoſed at a greater expence, and with leſs efficacy than ſhe does now. If, inſtead of the electorate of Hanover, a dunghill was the ſpot, where the fate of public liberty was to be diſputed and decided, we muſt forfeit the name of Britons, ſhould we abandon it; poſterity would curſe us, ſhould we give it up.

" How, ſays the conſider, did the war begin? The ſcene in Germany, opened with our being in alliance with the empreſs queen. And the king of P——a, under the encouragement of France, was threatening to invade the e—— —te: we looked over all the other parts of Europe in vain, and ſent to the fartheſt North, and agreed to give five hundred thouſand pounds to the court of Ruſſia, to march fifty thouſand men into P——, in order to find that prince employment at home." Were the reward of a thouſand pounds publiſhed in the news-papers, to outdo the falſities contained in the foregoing quotation, ſcarce a man in England would be found hardy enough to

attempt it. Our alliance with the empreſs-queen gave no manner of riſe to the preſent ſcene in Germany; accidents had thrown the intereſt of Pruſſia off its hinges. While the natural ſyſtem of the politics of Europe ſubſiſted, the houſes of Bourbon and Auſtria liv'd, if not at perpetual variance, at leaſt in perpetual jealouſy of one another. The king of Pruſſia had the ſtrongeſt reaſons to apprehend, that the houſe of Auſtria never would forgive his depriving it of Sileſia. He naturally ſought to ſtrengthen himſelf, by an alliance with that power, whoſe intereſt it was that the houſe of Auſtria, ſhould be kept low, and that power, which was France, as naturally embraced the occaſion. His late Majeſty, George the ſecond, during all this time, was purſuing the fixt, and till then, unvaried maxims of public liberty, by ſupporting the houſe of Auſtria. France, whoſe intereſt it always will be, that Germans ſhould cut one another's throats, moſt officiouſly offered to march an army into the empire, in ſupport of his Pruſſian majeſty. Had ſhe done it, there is no manner of doubt that the liberties of the Germanic body muſt have received their finiſhing ſtroke. Great-Britain was ſenſible of that, and her miniſtry ſtrove to prevent it, by entering into one of the cheapeſt contracts, that perhaps ever was made, with Ruſſia; and a contract, which, at the time it was made, aſtoniſhed France, but pleaſed all Europe beſides. But with what front hath the conſiderer ſaid that thoſe Ruſſians were deſigned to invade Pruſſia; what term, does ſuch an allegation, ſo baſe, ſo injurious, and ſo unſupported, deſerve? His late majeſty, by that contract with Ruſſia, proved himſelf equally the father of European, as of Britiſh, liberty. The ſchemes of the French were thus diſconcerted, and his Pruſſian majeſty, with equal wiſdom and magnanimity, declared that he was ready to draw his ſword againſt foreign troops, be they Ruſſian or be they French, who ſhould enter Germany.

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This was the point preciſely, which his late majeſty aimed at, and was the true baſis of that ſo much wiſhed for, ſo much applauded, reconciliation, which happened between him and his Pruſſian majeſty. If the conſiderer had the ſmalleſt grain of candour, or the leaſt ſpark of information, he would have informed the public, that the violence of the court of Vienna had diſguſted his late majeſty, long before the differences between France and England broke out. Like a wiſe and great prince as he was, he concealed the nakedneſs of the antient ally of his people and family, as long as he could, conſiſtently with his public faith and common juſtice. But the demands of the court of Vienna out-run all moderation. I ſhall not diſſemble, that the court of London perhaps did give the empreſs-queen ſome hopes of ſeeing her ſon made king of the Romans, and undoubtedly as the intereſt of Europe appeared to be at that time circumſtanced, it was extremely natural for his late majeſty to attempt ſuch a meaſure. Perhaps he did attempt it, and perhaps could it have been carried into execution, without tearing the fundamental conſtitution of Germany to pieces, he might have effected it. But the court of Vienna never had the ſmalleſt regard for that conſideration; her ambition muſt be gratified at the expence of Germanic liberty. His late majeſty's penetration and tenderneſs for that conſideration, and the impatience of the empreſs-queen, made him ſee what he ſcarcely could have believed, that the houſe of Auſtria now acted upon principles inconſiſtent with all their former engagements, and that the empreſs-queen, like another Juno, ſaid,

Flectere ſi nequeo ſuperos, Acheronta movebo.

If I cannot bring the king of England to join with me in the deſtruction of public liberty, I will call in the French, who, I am ſure, will be glad to ſecond me. Let Germany be ravaged, let her conſtitution be ruined, but let the houſe of Auſtria be great, and let her ride in the whirl-wind of public calamity.

Too many circumſtances at that time concurred, to flatter this preſumption: circumſtances that are without parallel in hiſtory. The French, by the weakeſt, but, at the ſame time, the moſt frantic, conduct ever known, took ſteps to drive the ſubjects of Great-Britain out of the empire of North-America. Such was the ruling paſſion of France. That of the empreſs-queen was, to have her ſon elected king of the Romans, and to be revenged upon the king of Pruſſia. The ruling paſſions in both parties coincided in one point. The friendſhip of Pruſſia was of leſs conſideration to France, than the empire of North-America was. The regaining Sileſia was thought of more importance by the court of Vienna, than all her former engagements, than every tye of gratitude and honour, and, when rightly conſidered, of intereſt. Thus an unnatural combination was formed againſt the liberties of Europe.

The objects which Great-Britain and Pruſſia had in their eyes, were the preſervation of the former's empire in North-America, and of the latter's poſſeſſion of Sileſia. The Germanic conſtitution, and the balance of power, were objects in common to both. Ought ſuch facts, or ſuch reaſoning, to be ſuppreſſed by one who calls himſelf a conſiderer on the preſent German war? Could any, but the moſt proſtitute of all writers, have aſked the following queſtion? "Was his Pruſſian majeſty's having fallen upon a proteſtant electorate, and, deſtroying Saxony, a ſervice done to Britain?" Who ever ſaid it was, or what buſineſs have Britons in the affair? A deep-laid ſcheme, and a treacherous combination was formed againſt the king of Proſſia, in which the elector of Saxony had a principal concern. His Pruſſian majeſty prevented the execution of ſo infamous a confederacy; nor does it matter a ſingle ſtraw, whether the confederates againſt him were proteſtants or papiſts; the elector of Saxony moſt undoubtedly is a papiſt; and it is equally undoubted,

undoubted, that when he gives the nod, the ſubjects of his electorate muſt fight in a popiſh quarrel.

Here I am aware of a poor, though plauſible, objection; the head it may be ſaid, of the landgraviate of Heſſe-Caſſel is not a proteſtant. True, but thanks to the care of his late majeſty, and the patriotiſm of his ſtates, he is a proteſtant power, and the proteſtant intereſt in his electorate, is ſecured ſo as not to be affected by any temporary or private ſyſtem of religion, that he has embraced. Is that the caſe with Saxony? No, the immaterial forms of worſhip, are not the barriers, or indeed characteriſtics, of proteſtantiſm. In ſhort, nothing is more certain, than that the Saxons did, and may fight in a popiſh cauſe, and upon popiſh principles; and I look upon the barons of England, though they undoubtedly believed in the pope, to have been the beſt proteſtants that ever breathed, when they obliged a tyrant to give them their magna charta.

Page 38, &c. The conſiderer takes pains to prove, that the money we pay to his Pruſſian majeſty, is, properly ſpeaking, a tribute. It is falſe; it is the cheapeſt bargain Great-Britain ever made, and the moſt honourable, as well as wiſe. The principles of the Britiſh conſtitution have ever been for her maintaining, for her defending, for her adopting the cauſe of the public liberty, againſt the oppreſſors of mankind; the ſame cauſe ſubſiſts, the ſame conduct is obſerved, and the like conſequences muſt follow, if Britons are not traitors to themſelves.

I ſhould be glad to know of the moſt ſanguine patron or abettor the conſiderer has, what the conſequences muſt have been, and what face Europe, at this time, muſt have preſented, had not England acted as ſhe has done. Muſt not the proteſtant intereſt, by which I mean public liberty, have been aboliſhed on the continent? Muſt not every port in Europe have been ſhut up againſt Britiſh ſhips, and muſt not every cabinet have excluded Britiſh councils, and have declared

clared againſt Britiſh intereſts? The reaſoning brought by the conſiderer, to prove that the king of Pruſſia, during the whole courſe of this war, is acting only for himſelf, is mere declamation, and if poſſible, leſs than nothing. There never was an alliance formed between two powers, who know what they are about, in which one of them did not make its own intereſt his firſt conſideration, and acted accordingly. I will even go farther, and ſay, that in the preſent war, the more ſelfiſh, and the more ſelf-intereſted his Pruſſian majeſty is, he is of the more ſervice to Britain, becauſe he thereby the more weakens her declared enemies.

But, ſays the conſiderer, and his advocates, (for I will place their arguments in the ſtrongeſt point of light) while Great-Britain has ſo home-felt, ſo acknowledged a ſuperiority by ſea, why ſhould ſhe embark in a German war? But can the conſiderer, with the ſmalleſt ſhew of propriety or reaſon, prove that Great-Britain would have had that ſuperiority, had France been at liberty to have employed againſt Britain thoſe troops, that to the number of two hundred and fifty thouſand men, have, ſince the commencement of this war, found their graves in Germany? In fact, where does our boaſted ſuperiority lie; by ſea? No; there never was the leaſt doubt of the ſuperiority of Great-Britain by ſea, ſince this war commenced; the unexpected and boaſted advantages we have gained over France, have been by land. We have diſpoſſeſſed them of North America, and a more certain fact was never laid down upon paper, than this, that had France been at liberty to ſend the tenth part of the troops to America, that ſhe has buried in Germany, the Engliſh nation would not, by this time, have poſſeſſed a ſingle foot of land upon that continent.

" The Hanoverians, ſays the conſiderer, may juſtly come within our compaſſion; but for that very reaſon we ought to ſeparate our cauſe from theirs, becauſe they are far removed out of our protection. Could the electorate ever have been deſigned to make a part

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of us, and to be thus tender to us as the apple of our eye; it would have been placed under the guard of our front, and not out of the reach even of our hands." This is a way of reaſoning that has more than once brought Great-Britain to the very verge of ruin. The principle upon which it is founded, is directly inconſiſtent with, and a libel upon, the act of ſettlement. Can it be ſuppoſed that king William, and the patriots who formed that act, did not foreſee all the inconveniencies that have ariſen, or can ariſe, from making an elector of Hanover king of Great-Britain? They, without all manner of doubt, ſaw that the electorate of Hanover would always be conſidered by France as a depoſit for the conduct of Great-Britain. But that conſideration rather confirmed them in, than deterred them from, their reſolution; they kept their eye upon one great object, which was that of maintaining the liberties of the Germanic body; or they thought that their having a German elector to be king of Great-Britain, ſtrengthened the common cauſe. They were not deceived; the event proved they were not; and while Britons continue faithful to themſelves, their reaſoning muſt hold good.

" But, ſays the conſiderer, the two houſes of parliament, it is ſaid, have promiſed that they will defend the electorate. If they were ſo imprudent as to promiſe ſuch a thing, we have now found it to be impoſſible; the fault therefore muſt be in the making ſuch a promiſe, and not in the non-performance of it; becauſe no promiſe binds to impoſſibilities."

Here our conſiderer takes for granted that which he ought previouſly to have proved, and it opens for him a field of declamation and invective, which, if admitted, would be very little for his own credit, and leſs for that of the nation. He tells us, the preſent German war alone, coſts more money than the whole ſea and land ſervice coſt in the duke of Marlborough's campaigns. Though this fact is extremely diſputable, nay falſe, if we include our ſervices in Spain, and

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make proper allowances for the differences of the value of money in the duke of Marlborough's time and the preſent, yet I ſhall for once admit what he ſays to be true. But how different are the complexions of the two wars? In the duke of Marlborough's campaigns, the Engliſh had nothing to hope for themſelves, but to maintain the balance of power. In the preſent war they have indeed the ſame object, but another, and a ſolid, conſideration is to be added to it, that is, the immenſe acquiſitions the nation has made in treaſure, trade, and territory, which I can by no means admit ſhe would, or could have made, had it not been for the diverſion which our arms gave to our enemies on the continent of Europe. "The time may come, ſays the conſiderer, when the nation, being exhauſted by the German war, and perhaps intimidated by that prince it is now upholding, may be forced to give up its own conqueſts, to buy him a peace." I own I neither underſtand the propriety, nor the meaning, of this ſentence. How is this nation likely to be intimidated by a prince, for whom ſhe is forced to buy a peace? I can as little underſtand the conſiderer's drift a few lines after, that the practicable way of defending Germany, is by attacking the French iſlands, and thereby ſecuring an ample indemnification for that part of Germany, for which alone we ought to have any concern.

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.

But it is, perhaps, what a Britiſh prince, parliament, and people, were Hanover now in the hands of the French, might not think quite ſo reaſonable; eſpecially as the conſiderer has been at ſo great pains to prove, that the electorate is of very little conſequence to France; a poſition, which, perhaps, if not carried to extravagance, is the moſt defenſible of any in his book.

From the 46th page of this pamphlet, the conſiderer employs great pains to prove, that no act of parliament has engaged the public faith to the ſupport

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of the preſent war; and he labours to ſhew that the words of the addreſs of the commons to his late majeſty, puts the parliament and Britiſh nation under no manner of obligation, becauſe they promiſed what was impoſſible and impracticable; and he brings the opinion of Grotius to prove, that under ſuch circumſtances, all ties are void. I may appeal to the conſiderer himſelf, whether in my repreſentation of his reaſoning, I have not done him juſtice; and now I ſhall give the words of the addreſs, quoted by the conſiderer. "We think ourſelves bound in gratitude to aſſiſt your majeſty againſt the inſults and attacks that may be made upon any of your majeſty's dominions, though not belonging to the crown of Great-Britain, in reſentment of the part your majeſty has taken in a cauſe, wherein the intereſts of this kingdom are ſo immediately, and ſo eſſentially concerned."

Hard muſt be the fate of any ſtate or prince depending upon that Britiſh honour, which has been always held ſo inviolable, were ſuch a doctrine to take place. He muſt know little of foreign concerns, who does not know, that for two hundred years paſt, the ſpeeches of the kings of England to their parliaments, and the addreſſes of thoſe parliaments in anſwer, have been, as it were, the pole ſtars, that have directed the conduct of Europe. Can any man read the words of the addreſs, as quoted above, and doubt that it does not amount to an abſolute promiſe to defend the electorate? And they give a good moral, as well as political, reaſon for it, "becauſe of his majeſty's magnanimous behaviour," a reaſon that can be applied to nothing leſs than what I have mentioned. "But, ſays the conſiderer, we have taken upon ourſelves the whole and abſolute defence of them;" and here he is at great pains to find out a difference between aſſiſting his majeſty, and doing the thing ourſelves, and he has laid out the point, to a degree of the moſt ſhameleſs chicane. But has that really been the caſe? No, the conſiderer himſelf admits the elec-

torate to have contributed what it can towards its own defence; if ſo, if his late majeſty was ever reduced to borrow, upon his own private credit, two hundred thouſand pounds, which he employed upon the defence of that electorate; if the Hanoverians riſqued, not only their properties, but their lives, and the entire deſolation of their country, upon reſuming their arms, after the French had broken the convention of Cloſter-Seven; if his late majeſty, as elector of Hanover, avowed that ſtep; and if great part of the troops, which ſo glorioufly drove them out of that electorate, were in Hanoverian pay, as undoubtedly they were; can Hanover be ſaid to have done nothing for herſelf? Or does what we have done for her, amount to more than the addreſs contains? Had not the parliament given his majeſty the aſſurances they did, I am far from ſaying, that by his conduct, he would not have equally conſulted the honour and intereſt of Great-Britain. But I will be bold to ſay, that, without hurting either, ſuppoſing Great-Britain to ſtand upon her own bottom, he could have avoided riſquing, as he did, his very property in that electorate, and in every other place of Germany. But upon the aſſurance of parliament, he bravely ſuffered it to embark, without reſerve, in the ſame common cauſe.

As to our author's ſtrengthening his reaſoning from Grotius; in the firſt place, I take Grotius to be no authority that is to direct the councils and conduct of Great-Britain; and in the next place, without waſting my readers time in crabbed quotations, Grotius declares flatly againſt the whole of his doctrine, as applicable to the preſent circumſtances of Great-Britain and Hanover. At the time the treaties of Ruſſia and the landgrave of Heſſe were debated in parliament, ſays the conſiderer, "all parties expreſsly declared, that they would not ſend a man out of the kingdom." I cannot ſay, that I remember any ſuch expreſs declaration from all parties; but I am candid enough to own, that the profeſſed view of thoſe treaties, (and how that view came to be altered is no ſecret to the public) was to

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prevent our ſending our troops out of the kingdom. Objects often varied, nay, ſome were annihilated; and thus a meaſure, which was not, at that time, perhaps, thought of, became afterwards, firſt expedient, and then neceſſary. In ſhort, the conſiderer will be puzzled to find any period of hiſtory, in which councils are not influenced by circumſtances, and that materially too, under the firmeſt adminiſtrations. I cannot, however, help obſerving, that the whole of our conſiderer's boaſted ſtrength falls to the ground, by one ſingle obſervation, which is, that it was not regarding the king of Pruſſia, but againſt the power of France, that the declaration in queſtion was made. The nation, indeed, was ſomewhat apprehenſive of the connexion between France and Ruſſia, but every man of ſenſe in England at that time knew, that all danger from the king of Pruſſia muſt vaniſh by the very meaſure purſued by Great-Britain. It is true, his Pruſſian majeſty at firſt was not explicit as to his deſigns; but, in that, he acted as every wiſe prince in his ſituation would have done, and the alliance between Pruſſia and Great-Britain ſoon reduced him to his true intereſt, which was, againſt his ſuffering any foreign troops, be who they will, to enter the empire, and the moment he refuſed to admit the aſſiſtance of France, the electorate of Hanover had nothing more to fear. But this matter has been already explained.

The conſiderer proceeds to tell us, " that when we promiſed to defend the electorate againſt the king of Pruſſia and the French, the reſt of the empire was to have been with us." This is ſo far from being the caſe, that the great oppoſition the meaſure met with in the houſe, aroſe from the queen of Hungary being unable, and the other princes of the empire being unwilling, to aſſiſt us; nor had we the ſmalleſt encouragement to hope that, that would be the caſe. " The promiſe, continues the conſiderer, was to pay Ruſſians to fight againſt P——ns; is the paying

P——ns to fight againſt Ruſſians, due to the performance?" Again I deny, that we did promiſe to pay Ruſſians to fight againſt Pruſſians, but we certainly did promiſe to defend the electorate by means of Ruſſians; and when thoſe means were taken from us, we, in juſtice and honour, were obliged to have recourſe to other means, which we are now purſuing.

The reader is to obſerve, that I am now attempting a vindication of the conduct of his late majeſty and the Britiſh miniſtry; nor is he to expect, that I am to ſtep out of the way to vindicate the Hanoverian chancery in what they did. Perhaps, if the truth was known, they looked upon themſelves, according to the ſtate of parties then in England, to be doomed as victims to a popular outcry. For my own part, I never could approve of the rancour and virulence with which that poor electorate was then treated. The convention of Cloſter-Seven took its riſe from an apprehenſion, the Hanoverian chancery had, that it was not in the power of their ſovereign, to protect them from the miſeries that threatened them. This, were it proper and decent, would be no very difficult matter to prove. I will even go ſo far as to ſay, that, it is more than probable, in ſuch a ſituation of things, the regency, or as the conſiderer calls them, the chancery of Hanover, conſidered the intereſt of the elector, and themſelves, in a very different light from thoſe of Great-Britain and its ſovereign.

The conſiderer, about the 55th, 56th, and the ſubſequent pages of his pamphlet, comes to what he calls his moſt important point, which is neither more nor leſs than to prove, that we ought to carry on the war with France by ſea; " by which means, ſays he, we will realiſe to this nation a revenue of five millions a year for ever, at our enemies expence, and totally diſable France hereafter from raiſing a marine power, which can ever be in any degree formidable to Britain." The public of Great-Britain would be extremely obliged to the conſiderer, if he would

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point out to them the ſituation of the French iſlands, where thoſe five millions, even ſuppoſing them French livres, grow. If he means Martinico, it never was worth five millions of French livres to the crown of France, and its importonce aroſe chiefly from its vicinity to the iſland of Guadaloupe. But are we not, at this time, diſtreſſing the French upon that iſland? Have we not the ſtrongeſt reaſon to ſay, that our government is doing the very thing, ſo injudiciouſly and unſeaſonably pointed out by the conſiderer, with no view but to impoſe upon the ignorant, and inflame the unwary? If he means, that we are to attack the French part of Hiſpaniola, and to make a conqueſt of it for ourſelves, tho' in truſt for our allies, it would not be long before a more pernicious war, even than what he has repreſented the Germanic war to be, might be carried on againſt Great-Britain, ſince the French poſſeſſions upon that iſland are known to be under the protection of Spain, and to be held only in ſufferance from her. If he means the paultry diſtant poſſeſſions the French hold at the mouth of the Miſſiſippi and in Louiſiana, they are no objects of a national armament; and they could ſcarcely indemnify the expence of a ſmall ſquadron of privateers, were they to undertake the conqueſt. In ſhort, I will venture to ſay, that all thoſe poſſeſſions put together, never were worth to the crown of France, and never can be worth to us, the twentieth part of the ſum, at which the conſiderer has rated them. But, after all that has been ſaid, what authority hath the conſiderer to ſuppoſe, that any of thoſe attempts have been neglected by our being engaged in a German war? As to the irretrievable deſtruction of the French marine, has not that been actually effected? And it is time enough for the conſiderer to rail againſt our government, when he ſees them make a peace that ſhall leave France at liberty to re-eſtabliſh it. In ſhort, if the French iſlands can bring, either to them or to Great-Britain, five millions ſterling

ling a year, they are of more worth, than half the revenue of France itſelf.

"In the firſt place, ſays the conſiderer, this is a war, in which Britain ſtands ſingle and alone, to contend at land with France. And how much ſoever we may flatter ourſelves with the notion of our own ſtrength, and the French weakneſs, France is at this time, and it has been for a century paſt, ſuperior to us at land." This is the ſum of what the conſiderer has ſaid on this head, which takes up ſeveral pages of his pamphlet. I ſhall for once not diſpute this fact, if he means only, that France can bring much greater armies into the field than Great-Britain can; but I muſt and will affirm; that thoſe armies are nothing comparable in a day of action to Britiſh troops, nor have they ever been found to be ſo; and in affirming this, I have on my ſide the credit of all hiſtory, when the troops of the two nations ever fought with one another, in the ſmalleſt terms of equality. I ſhall allow the advantage in point of military diſcipline, tactics, and military operations, to have been, at certain times, on the ſide of the French; but I totally deny, that they are in poſſeſſion of thoſe advantages at preſent, or have been for ſome years. A candid writer muſt allow, that the ſtrength of a ſtate in war does not conſiſt in the number of her own natives ſhe can bring into the field. The Carthaginians could bring but few; yet by the help of commerce they were enabled, at a much greater diſtance than Germany is from England, to bring Rome to the brink of ruin. I muſt add, that tho' one ſtate may exceed another in the number of national troops by land, yet the latter may have vaſt advantages in war, if, to a reaſonable number of brave national troops, ſhe ſhall likewiſe add a marine too ſtrong for all the naval forces in the world, when collected into one fleet, to look it in the face, which at preſent is the caſe of Great-Britain. The conſiderer may flouriſh away upon former events that happened in favour of France.

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The preſent time ought to be the only ſubject of his conſideration; and he can produce no period that can be brought in the leaſt parallel with it, whether we conſider our own internal ſtrength, the glory acquired by our troops, the force of our marine, the importance of our conqueſts, and, what is of more weight than all, the unanimity of the nation; a conſideration, which deſtroys all parallels that can be formed, with regard to the circumſtances of this nation, ſince the days of queen Elizabeth to the preſent. As to the loſs, which the French power ſuſtained by the battles of Blenheim and Ramillies, exaggerated as they are by the conſiderer, they are in no degree comparable, ſetting aſide the havock of the ſword, to the number they have loſt in Germany by diſeaſes, fatigue, famine, and every kind of indigence.

In pages 60 and 61 of the Conſiderations, our author employs ſome very flimſy reaſoning, to prove, that we made a very bad bargain with Pruſſia. "In fact, though we are an ally to him, he is none to us. Our treaty with him, ſays the conſiderer, will not oblige him to furniſh us either with money or troops, ſhould we want them ever ſo much." Nobody was ever wrong-headed enough to imagine the treaty was made for any ſuch purpoſe; it was made to prevent the abſolute deſtruction of the proteſtant intereſt, upon the continent, and it has hitherto anſwered that purpoſe, notwithſtanding the formidable and unexpected traverſes it has met with.

"What then (ſays the conſiderer in the next page) have we gained by this ally? Two things: the one is, the being obliged to pay him money to enable him to fight his own battles againſt enemies which Britain has no quarrel with; the other is, the driving the reſt of the German princes into a cloſer union with France, and making ourſelves obnoxious to Europe for ſupporting this ally. Can it be ſuppoſed, that Britain is the ſtronger for either of theſe?" In anſwer to thoſe round queſtions, I ſay, that Britain always has

has had, and that ſhe always ought to have, a quarrel with thoſe powers, who attempt to deſtroy the liberties of Europe. Suppoſing the confederacy between the courts of Vienna, France, Saxony, and Ruſſia, who is neither papiſt nor proteſtant, and is to be conſidered rather as an Aſiatic, than an European power, had been carried into execution, what muſt have been the conſequence?. By what I have ſuggeſted, how can the prevention of it drive the German princes into a cloſer union with France, while the latter is ſo intimately connected with the houſe of Auſtria, which has always been their oppreſſors, when they fled to France for refuge? The extinction of the proteſtant intereſt in Germany, it is to be feared, would have extinguiſhed the Germanic conſtitution itſelf, while that ambition and bigottry, which have always diſtinguiſhed the houſe of Auſtria, was ſupported and abetted by the guaranties of the treaty of Weſtphalia. What ſupported the liberties of Germany, and conſequently of Europe, before the preſent war broke out, but the enmity between the houſes of Bourbon and Auſtria? That enmity being diſſolved, the former balance of power vaniſhed; and the honour, dignity, and intereſt of Great-Britain called upon her to form another. She has done it, and ſhe could have done it by no other means, than ſhe has purſued.

The greateſt art, which the conſiderer has employed through the whole of his pamphlet, and which he carries on to an amazing degree from the 62d to the 68th page, is to repreſent the king of Pruſſia as a ſelf-intereſted prince. Were I to ſpeak my own private thoughts, I muſt ſay, the greater his ſelf-intereſt is, he will be the more uſeful and the more faithful ally to Great-Britain; from whoſe friendſhip, after what has happened, he never can find it his intereſt to depart. I ſhall ſpeak nothing of gratitude or honour; but while the preſent war laſts, can it be his intereſt to abandon his alliance

with

with Great-Britain? I believe, even the conſiderer will not be hardy enough to affirm it. Suppoſing a peace was to take place, would he, after what has happened, throw himſelf into the arms of France? No; he muſt be ſenſible, that while there is a poſſibility of a miſunderſtanding ariſing between Great-Britain and France, his danger recurs, and then he would be in a worſe condition than ever, through the renewed connections between Auſtria and Bourbon. This muſt hereafter always be the caſe. No peace can make Auſtria loſe ſight of her claims upon Sileſia; or France of hers, for the damage we have done her in this war, and the territories we have taken from her. Theſe are conſiderations which, however plain and ſhort, I think abſolutely deſtroy all the declamation employed by our author againſt our connexion with Pruſſia. The perſonal invectives the conſider has thrown out againſt him, are as void of truth, as they are of decency, and deſerve no anſwer.

The conſiderer next returns to his old topic of the inequality between France and England in a land-war between them, on the continent; and he repreſents all the powers in Europe as being averſe to the cauſe we are fighting in. The meaneſt coffee-houſe politician knows the reaſon. Ruſſia has claims, Sweden has claims upon Ruſſia, which have been long quieted by treaties, and are therefore unjuſt. The ſituation of the king of Denmark, between Ruſſia and Sweden, with regard to Holſtein, has been very tickliſh, and becoming more ſo every day, does not admit him to part with a ſingle ſubject from the defence of his own dominions. The death of the prince and princeſs of Orange have given the Dutch government back to the Loveſtein faction, who think, that it is their intereſt to join with France, and ſecretly to abett her againſt the rivals of her commerce. Ambition, and the hope of ſharing in the ſpoils and dignities of two electorates, have driven

ſome of the German princes, even proteſtants, from their true intereſts, and others are over-awed by the thunders of the aulic council, ſupported by the power of France. As to the proteſtants of Saxony, who have taken ſervice with our enemies, perhaps their numbers will not be found to be very great, when we conſider, that the inhabitants, at leaſt of one half of Saxony, are papiſts. But, be that as it will, no prince, when his conduct is fundamentally right, is obliged to anſwer for conſequences. As to Switzerland, I apprehend, we and our allies have the ſame right to recruit there, as France has, and a much better title, becauſe we have more money to pay them. As to Italy, Germany, and Flanders, France can recruit in no part of them, but in the territories of the empreſs-queen, which we may reaſonably preſume, are already ſufficiently exhauſted.

Page 69 and 70 of the Conſiderations are employed in ſhewing, that the French have more funds to carry on war than Great-Britain has. But as the conſiderer has his information only from one gentleman, whom he does not name, and as the diſtreſſed ſtate of France and her finances, even to a profeſſed bankruptcy, is well known, and indiſputable, the argument certainly lies againſt him. But even ſuppoſing the French treaſury to be poſſeſſed of the ſums the conſiderer mentions, let us, with the Spaniſh ambaſſador in the treaſury of Venice, take the candle, and examine where is the root from which thoſe treaſures grow. Has not Great-Britain laid the ax to it? Is it not abſolutely cut off by the loſs of her marine, trade, and poſſeſſions in all parts of the world? The reverſe of all this is the caſe of Great-Britain. Look at the ſtate of French priſoners in England, read the remonſtrances of French parliaments, conſult the beſt accounts of the ſtate of their provinces, peopled by inhabitants, ſo diſpirited through want, that they think it a happineſs to be carried to the leſs lingering butchery of the field.

field. But the whole of this point is ſo much againſt our conſiderer, in the mind of every man in England, excepting a few oſtentatious, deſperate, advocates for the cauſe, eſpouſed by the conſiderer, that I am ſafe in reſting it here.

" Every one who has thought on the ſubject of war, muſt have conſidered the three different kinds of it: a war of offence, a war of equality, and a war of defence. And every one knows, that of theſe the laſt is moſt diſadvantageous, and the moſt difficult." Theſe are ſounds, drawn from ſpeculation, paper-ſtaining warriors, and caſtle-building politicians; but they are diſclaimed by practice and experience. Every war in its own nature becomes offenſive, whatever the pretences may have been, upon which it was originally founded. If an army of defence, can offend the enemy, the means of offence becomes the moſt effectual principle of defence. Strength or weakneſs, courage or conduct, are all the conſiderations generals have, whether they fight in a war of offence, a war of equality, or a war of defence, and the meaning of theſe words vaniſhes, according to events. The conſiderer ſays, that neither the duke of Cumberland, nor prince Ferdinand, could force the French to a pitched battle. I underſtand the battle of Minden to have been a pitched battle, and that we did force the French to fight it in the manner it was fought; whether the French were forced to fight at Haſtenbeck, I know not. But I am convinced, that, ſuperior as they were to his royal highneſs, in numbers and artillery; had one half of the troops under him been Britiſh, he muſt have been deciſively victorious. As to the argument the conſiderer ſo long dwells upon, and ſo affectedly repeats, that France can draw out greater armies than we can, let the battle of Minden anſwer, whether they can produce ſo good troops. In ſhort, the number that France can bring to the field, unleſs they can be proved to be

better troops than thoſe of Great-Britain, is an argument againſt our going to war, that is below all contempt. Is there in this reſpect a greater diſparity between France and Great-Britain, than there was between the Greeks and the Perſians, than there was between the Romans and Barbarians, thoſe anceſtors of the preſent French and Auſtrians?

"Suppoſe us, ſays the conſiderer, to gain a compleat victory, is there any fruit of it to be reaped in Germany." This is his main queſtion; all that follows on it is but flouriſh. My anſwer is, we gain all that we propoſed, the freeing a proteſtant electorate, expoſed to all the horrors of war upon our account; we weaken the power of the oppreſſors of Europe, we blunt the ſwords, that are drawn againſt the liberties of mankind, and we are, at leaſt, one ſtep nearer towards procuring a peace, which may reſtore Great-Britain and Europe to freedom and tranquillity. The ideal reaſoning that follows the imaginary triumph of the author, upon the above queſtion, deſerves no anſwer, becauſe the facts, ſuppoſed in it, never can have any exiſtence, and can have no relation to the preſent queſtion. It cannot be imagined, that the preſent government, could be mad enough to purſue ſuch a ſcheme as the conſiderer has laid down for the future plan of their operations. Britiſh troops are not to follow an enemy into quarters, where Britiſh money is already more efficaciouſly employed; the obſervations I have already made, of the exhauſted ſtate of France, deſtroy all probability of the French leading us into thoſe wild-gooſe chaces the author has ſuppoſed.

The conſiderer has thrown out ſarcaſms againſt our employing a foreign general or generals, in the German war. But, as uſual, he has ſubſtituted words for realities. The preſent war, candidly conſidered, is no farther on our part, a German war, than as we fight for our allies in Germany, againſt our enemies there. We attack no German prince, we ſup-

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port no German meaſures, farther than as the ſupport o German freedom and independency is connected with the intereſt of Great-Britain, which it always has been.

Page 90, the conſiderer falls with great reaſon, as I think, upon the abuſe of public news writing in England; I ſubſcribe to all he ſays on that head. But, at the ſame time, I muſt make a diſtinction between what comes from the pens of thoſe hirelings of the preſs, and the authority of the government, and even the parliament itſelf. If ſome pragmatical politicians, or buſy fund-brokers, railed againſt the king of Pruſſia, there was not a man of ſenſe in England, who did not bewail the untowardly ſyſtem that kept him and us divided. The conſiderer knows well, that there was not, in both houſes of parliament, a topic more frequently mentioned, than the expediency of cloſing, almoſt at any rate, with his Pruſſian majeſty, and thereby forming a firm barrier, and a natural defence, for the proteſtant intereſt. Did the conſiderer, or any of his friends, in thoſe times, ſtand up and diſpute thoſe propoſitions, as they were aſſented to, even by the miniſters, againſt whom they were obliquely aimed? Mr. Pelham himſelf was again and again heard to declare, that when the circumſtances of affairs would admit, not a moment ſhould be loſt, in compleating ſo deſirable a connexion; and all the other miniſters ſeemed to be of the ſame mind. When the connexion was formed, the government of England, perhaps, at no time, entered into a meaſure, that met with ſo univerſal an approbation. It may be improper for me to mention, that the great perſonage, who is now no more, always ſpoke with regret of the circumſtances that kept him at a diſtance from his nephew, and has been known, with an unuſual ſharpneſs, to check the officious courtiers about his perſon, when they ſpoke diſreſpectfully of him.

Even when his Pruſſian majeſty (who being an inland power was not extremely well acquainted with maritime affairs) ſent over the famous memorial, complaining

plaining of the confiſcation of his ſhips; the anſwer returned, by order of the court of London, was penned with all the politeneſs due to a ſovereign prince, in alliance with us. Has the conſiderer forgot what happened after this, upon the ſame ſubject? The anſwer that went from London, was ſuch as convinced his Pruſſian majeſty of the rectitude of our court of admiralty's proceedings, and his Britannic majeſty's intentions. What was the conſequence? He dropped his remonſtrance, and he kept his faith, in paying the intereſt on the Sileſian loan. Upon the whole therefore, he muſt have been born but yeſterday, who can be impoſed upon by the ſo many repeated aſſertions in the Conſiderations, of the deteſtation his Pruſſian majeſty was formerly held in by the Britiſh nation. Impertinents in politicks we have many, whoſe knowledge ariſes out of the fumes of coffee and tobacco; but the talk of ſuch never can be conſtrued into the ſenſe of the people of Britain. I ſhall not differ much from our conſiderer, with regard to a certain ribband and title beſtowed; but I cannot think it was beſtowed, on account of vulgar prepoſſeſſions, and on the report of idle, ignorant news-mongers; they were beſtowed at a time when it was thought proper and prudent to give exemplary rewards, even to the *ſhew* of reſolution and reſiſtance.

The railing of our conſiderer at the Ruſſian treaty, is frivolous and thread-bare, and yet he is ingenuous enough to own (page 94,) that it was made ſolely to keep all foreign troops out of the empire. Undoubtedly, as we have obſerved before, it was. But it is as certain, that, before the treaty was made, the court of France, unknown either to his Britannic or Pruſſian majeſty, was far advanced in the treaty of Vienna; nay, it was then as good as concluded, and we very ſoon found, from the chevalier Duglaſs's negociations, on the part of France, at the court of Peterſburg, too much reaſon to apprehend, that if the Ruſſian troops had got footing in the empire, even upon our requiſition, they would have inſiſted

upon

upon their own terms before they had evacuated it. That the Ruſſians were hired to defend the electorate of Hanover, againſt all invaders, is admitted. That they were hired to ravage the Pruſſian dominions, or that the king of Pruſſia intended to invade Hanover at that time is denied.

Having ſaid thus much, I muſt be candid enough to own, before the treaty of London was made, his late majeſty (though he wiſely kept it to himſelf) had great reaſons to ſuſpect the intentions of the court of Vienna, and her motives, or rather encouragement, for making certain demands upon him, which in honour, and conſcience, he could not comply with. What muſt become of our author's reaſoning, if it ſhould appear that ſome of thoſe demands regarded even the king of Pruſſia? Did not the natural ſeaſon, the *optanda dies*, then preſent itſelf, and what treatment muſt his majeſty's miniſters have met with from the public, had they not joined the national voice, and concluded the treaty of London. "We had been uſed to think, ſays the conſiderer, (page 95,) the king of Pruſſia, (I dont ſay rightly) had ſhewn in his actions, a neglect of all moral obligation, and in his writings, a contempt of every religious principle." Who are *we?* Does the conſiderer claſs himſelf with the officious ſhatter-brains of coffee-houſes? The people of England never thought ſo of the conqueror of Sileſia; they never ſpoke thus of the author of the Anti-Machiavel. Every men of ſenſe and candour ſpoke and thought the reverſe. They ſaw the king of Pruſſia under the diſagreeable neceſſity of maintaining his alliance with France, through the injuſtice and obſtinacy of the court of Vienna, who forced him to maintain that alliance, though he offered, again and again, to renounce it, and to join in keeping the French out of the empire, provided ſhe would do him juſtice in his claims upon Sileſia. Thoſe claims were, to the people of England, problematical

blematical at leaſt, and they neither could, nor did, give them diſguſt, far leſs, deteſtation.

In all political writings, when facts are anſwered, (and I think I have anſwered every fact advanced by the conſiderer) the reſt muſt go for declamation. That is what I cannot anſwer. The charges againſt his Pruſſian majeſty, and our own miniſtry, are repeated over and over again, and ſpun through a hundred and thirty-ſeven pages, with an acrimony void of ſpirit, arguments that are deſtitute of reaſon; charges, unſupported by truth; allegations, not founded on facts; and tautologies, which prove the writer to be no admirer of Tacitus. His declamations and definitions upon continental connexions, and upon the difficulty of underſtanding them as they ought to be underſtood, are metaphyſical, vague, and idle. Every cobler, I was going to ſay, knows what a continental connexion is, as well as any member of either houſe of parliament; and though our author repreſents his ſplittings of the queſtion to be new and uncommon, yet there has not been perhaps a more hackney'd topic in politicks, ſince the Revolution; nor has he fallen upon a ſingle diviſion or ſubdiviſion, that has not been bruſhed thread-bare by Tories and Jacobites in their writings againſt the act of Settlement, and for the treaty of Utrecht. Let the author prove (and then he will ſay ſomething) that our connexions with Pruſſia, or, if he pleaſes, with the continent, at this time, are not as well founded, and as juſtifiable, and perhaps more neceſſary, than thoſe formed by king William, in that alliance which the conſiderer has employed ſuch a needleſs pomp of language to amplify. Our conſiderer, again and again, mentions our being without thoſe allies, which king William and queen Anne had: I have given the plain and true reaſon why we are without them, and probably muſt be without them, till the proteſtant confederacy has broken the chains of Europe. I am far from detracting from the merits or abilities of our great deliverer. But what has his

conduct

conduct or character to do with the preſent queſtion, unleſs he can ſhew, that Great-Britain and Europe were in leſs danger, at the time the treaty of London was ſigned, than it was at the time the grand alliance was formed by king William? I am even afraid our conſiderer has over-ſtrained his complaiſance to the memory of that monarch. He has given us a moſt pompous account of the congreſs, in which the grand alliance was formed; and ſuch a meeting, compoſed of ſo many illuſtrious parties, all of them enemies to France, never perhaps was known in Europe. I am unwilling to ſay it, but it is a well known truth, that the ſplendor and frequency of that meeting, was the greateſt misfortune of king William's reign. It ſuggeſted to his enemies, a natural and puzzling queſtion. If ſo many mighty potentates, are to go to war againſt France, why is England to pay a greater proportion, in the expences of that war, than all thoſe mighty potentates put together? nay, in fact, the whole of the expence; for man's fleſh, (unleſs when it is hired, orlet out) has always been very cheap on the continent, eſpecially in Germany.

While I am upon this head, which I have touched with the utmoſt reluctance, I am ſorry that our conſiderer's calculation of our expence during king William and queen Anne's wars, obliges me to repeat an obſervation I have made before; that it is a groſs impoſition upon the ſenſe of the public, to array the ſums of thoſe times againſt the preſent; becauſe the intrinſic value of money in Great-Britain is now diminiſhed. The intereſt which money bears in a ſtate, a commercial one I mean, may be called the pulſe, which indicates the health or indiſpoſition of the body-politic. The government in thoſe times gave for money, ſix or ſeven, nay ſometimes more, per cent. At this time they give at moſt three and a half. I ſhall not, from this, conclude, that Great-Britain has, at preſent, double the money in ſpecie, that ſhe had

under king William, or queen Anne; but I will venture to ſay, however paradoxical it may appear, ſhe is at this time doubly able to bear the expences.

" To talk, ſays the conſiderer, (page 114) of forming a connexion with that, which is in itſelf unconnected, is a contradiction in terms." This is profeſſedly a gingle of words. Was the continent connected in itſelf, I mean, even againſt France, in queen Anne's time? Did not king William, even before his death, break thoſe connexions, for which our author ſo pompouſly applauds him, ſo that queen Anne in the beginning of her reign, found Europe as unconnected as it is now? The empire in itſelf, torn in pieces by the defection of one of its moſt powerful electors from the common cauſe, while others of them were more covertly friends to France; Sweden ſo near declaring againſt us, that we were obliged to have recourſe to gratifying the pride of that monarch, by ſending the duke of Marlborough to him, to work upon his private paſſions, which he did in a manner not altogether becoming the dignity of his miſtreſs and his country. All Spain, and the greateſt part of Italy in arms againſt us, and even the duke of Savoy our friend, only becauſe Britain was the moſt capable to be his, againſt the more than inſolence of the French monarch; and what was worſe than all, Great-Britain, by being then unconnected in herſelf, gave the enemy double advantages.

" Why, ſays the conſiderer, (page 116) ſhould any part of the war, which, as the preſent war, began with a conteſt about foreign ſettlements, have its courſe diverted into a land-war in Germany, for we were always victorious at ſea?" I don't diſpute our being always ſuperior to France by ſea in power, but I cannot admit, we have been ſo in fortune; neither do I think, that the experiments of deſcents we have made upon the French coaſts, have in any

degree

degree anſwered the plauſible principles on which they were founded. The conſiderer himſelf furniſhes the ſtrongeſt reaſon why they have not; becauſe France is extremely populous, and has always a militia, independent of her army. If ſo, ſuch pelting deſcents, which are attended with infinite trouble and fatigue to our ſoldiers, will always be oppoſed by their militia, who are very little, if at all inferior, to their regulars. This, at leaſt, is the way we argue in England, becauſe the great end of our militia was to guard our coaſts againſt deſcents, and leave our army at liberty to act elſewhere. Our author goes on to ſhew (p. 119.) "that if our war in Germany is a war of diverſion, it is not an eligible diverſion." Diverſion is certainly one of the objects of our German war, and notwithſtanding all our author's fine-ſpun arguments, the meaſure has hitherto been ſucceſsful. What can he mean by eligible diverſion? War itſelf is not eligible, when peace can be equitably preſerved. But has our author pointed out, where we could have made a more eligible diverſion, or has he proved that no diverſion was proper? "But, ſays he, (p. 120) our German war is no diverſion at all for the French forces," though he owns in the ſame breath, that it employs them. Yes, and I will add, it deſtroys them likewiſe, even without the aſſiſtance of the ſword; ſo miſerably are they ſupplied. To make out this notable reaſoning of his, the conſiderer tells us, that the French leave not a man fewer upon their coaſts on account of their army in Germany. Who ſays they have? But the conſiderer will find it no eaſy taſk to prove, that ſince the beginning of the war they have not ſuffered a loſs of men in Germany, which the populouſneſs of France (great as it is) will not be able for many years to repair. He never can perſuade any man, who has his ſenſes about him, that France is not become a national bankrupt, by her war in Germany; or that, had ſhe not found diverſion,

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or if the conſiderer pleaſes, employment for her troops in Germany, ſhe might not ſtill have found means to have triumphed over us in America. It will be impoſſible to perſuade the world, that France can keep a hundred and twenty thouſand men in a country, that always has been, and is now, the grave of the French, with as little expence of blood and treaſure, as they are at, when they are in quarters or garriſons in their own country, in a time of peace, which admits of their employing themſelves in manufactures and agriculture, and in repairing thoſe calamities of their country, which are ſo feelingly ſet forth by the remonſtrances of their parliaments.

Our author, by his own confeſſion, thinks, that the latter pages of his pamphlet contains a recapitulation, or rather, a repetition of what he had ſaid before; and as they undoubtedly are ſuch, I ſhall not pretend to anſwer them, becauſe I have, ſtep by ſtep, anſwered every argument, without employing that declamation, which he has ſo induſtriouſly made uſe of, to decry the preſent government of England, to throw perſonal abuſe, even in deſcending to perſonalties, againſt our illuſtrious ally.

FINIS.